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1
1 Introduction
The original Parrondo (1996) games can be described as follows: Let p := 12 − ε
and
p0 :=
1
10
− ε, p1 := 3
4
− ε, (1)
where ε > 0 is a small bias parameter (less than 1/10, of course). In game A,
the player tosses a p-coin (i.e., p is the probability of heads). In game B, if the
player’s current capital is divisible by 3, he tosses a p0-coin, otherwise he tosses
a p1-coin. (Assume initial capital is 0 for simplicity.) In both games, the player
wins one unit with heads and loses one unit with tails.
It can be shown that games A and B are both losing games, regardless of
ε, whereas the random mixture C := 12A +
1
2B (toss a fair coin to determine
which game to play) is a winning game for ε sufficiently small. Furthermore,
certain nonrandom patterns, including AAB, ABB, and AABB but excluding
AB, are winning as well, again for ε sufficiently small. These are examples of
Parrondo’s paradox.
The terms “losing” and “winning” are meant in an asymptotic sense. More
precisely, assume that the game (or mixture or pattern of games) is repeated
ad infinitum. Let Sn be the player’s cumulative profit after n games for n ≥ 1.
A game (or mixture or pattern of games) is losing if limn→∞ Sn = −∞ a.s.,
it is winning if limn→∞ Sn = ∞ a.s., and it is fair if −∞ = lim infn→∞ Sn <
lim supn→∞ Sn = ∞ a.s. These definitions are due in this context to Key,
K losek, and Abbott (2006).
Because the games were introduced to help explain the so-called flashing
Brownian ratchet (Ajdari and Prost 1992), much of the work on this topic has
appeared in the physics literature. Survey articles include Harmer and Abbott
(2002), Parrondo and Din´ıs (2004), Epstein (2007), and Abbott (2009).
Game B can be described as capital-dependent because the coin choice de-
pends on current capital. An alternative game B, called history-dependent, was
introduced by Parrondo, Harmer, and Abbott (2000): Let
p0 :=
9
10
− ε, p1 = p2 := 1
4
− ε, p3 := 7
10
− ε, (2)
where ε > 0 is a small bias parameter. Game A is as before. In game B, the
player tosses a p0-coin (resp., a p1-coin, a p2-coin, a p3-coin) if his two previous
results are loss-loss (resp., loss-win, win-loss, win-win). He wins one unit with
heads and loses one unit with tails.
The conclusions for the history-dependent games are the same as for the
capital-dependent ones, except that the pattern AB need not be excluded.
Pyke (2003) proved a strong law of large numbers for the Parrondo player’s
sequence of profits in the capital-dependent setting. In the present paper we
generalize his result and obtain a central limit theorem as well. We formulate
a stochastic model general enough to include both the capital-dependent and
the history-dependent games. We also treat separately the case in which the
potentially winning game is a random mixture of the two losing games (game A
2
is played with probability γ, and game B is played with probability 1− γ) and
the case in which the potentially winning game (or, more precisely, pattern of
games) is a nonrandom pattern of the two losing games, specifically the pattern
[r, s], denoting r plays of game A followed by s plays of game B. Finally, we
replace (1) by
p0 :=
ρ2
1 + ρ2
− ε, p1 := 1
1 + ρ
− ε,
where ρ > 0; (1) is the special case ρ = 1/3. We also replace (2) by
p0 :=
1
1 + κ
− ε, p1 = p2 := λ
1 + λ
− ε, p3 := 1− λ
1 + κ
− ε,
where κ > 0, λ > 0, and λ < 1+ κ; (2) is the special case κ = 1/9 and λ = 1/3.
The reasons for these parametrizations are explained in Sections 3 and 4.
Section 2 formulates our model and derives an SLLN and a CLT. Section 3
specializes to the capital-dependent games and their random mixtures, showing
that the Parrondo effect is present whenever ρ ∈ (0, 1) and γ ∈ (0, 1). Section 4
specializes to the history-dependent games and their random mixtures, showing
that the Parrondo effect is present whenever either κ < λ < 1 or κ > λ > 1
and γ ∈ (0, 1). Section 5 treats the nonrandom patterns [r, s] and derives an
SLLN and a CLT. Section 6 specializes to the capital-dependent games, showing
that the Parrondo effect is present whenever ρ ∈ (0, 1) and r, s ≥ 1 with one
exception: r = s = 1. Section 7 specializes to the history-dependent games.
Here we expect that the Parrondo effect is present whenever either κ < λ < 1
or κ > λ > 1 and r, s ≥ 1 (without exception), but although we can prove it
for certain specific values of κ and λ (such as κ = 1/9 and λ = 1/3), we cannot
prove it in general. Finally, Section 8 addresses the question of why Parrondo’s
paradox holds.
In nearly all cases we obtain formulas for the mean and variance parame-
ters of the CLT. These parameters can be interpreted as the asymptotic mean
per game played and the asymptotic variance per game played of the player’s
cumulative profit. Of course, the pattern [r, s] comprises r + s games.
Some of the algebra required in what follows is rather formidable, so we have
used Mathematica 6 where necessary. Our .nb files are available upon request.
2 A general formulation of Parrondo’s games
In some formulations of Parrondo’s games, the player’s cumulative profit Sn
after n games is described by some type of random walk {Sn}n≥1, and then
a Markov chain {Xn}n≥0 is defined in terms of {Sn}n≥1; for example, Xn ≡
ξ0+Sn (mod 3) in the capital-dependent games, where ξ0 denotes initial capital.
However, it is more logical to introduce the Markov chain {Xn}n≥0 first and
then define the random walk {Sn}n≥1 in terms of {Xn}n≥0.
Consider an irreducible aperiodic Markov chain {Xn}n≥0 with finite state
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space Σ. It evolves according to the one-step transition matrix1 P = (Pij)i,j∈Σ.
Let us denote its unique stationary distribution by pi = (pii)i∈Σ. Let w : Σ×Σ 7→
R be an arbitrary function, which we will sometimes write as a matrix W :=
(w(i, j))i,j∈Σ and refer to as the payoff matrix. Finally, define the sequences
{ξn}n≥1 and {Sn}n≥1 by
ξn := w(Xn−1, Xn), n ≥ 1, (3)
and
Sn := ξ1 + · · ·+ ξn, n ≥ 1. (4)
For example, let Σ := {0, 1, 2}, putX0 := ξ0 (mod 3), ξ0 being initial capital,
and let the payoff matrix be given by2
W :=

 0 1 −1−1 0 1
1 −1 0

 . (5)
With the role of P played by
PB :=

 0 p0 1− p01− p1 0 p1
p1 1− p1 0

 ,
where p0 and p1 are as in (1), Sn represents the player’s profit after n games
when playing the capital-dependent game B repeatedly. With the role of P
played by
PA :=

 0 p 1− p1− p 0 p
p 1− p 0

 ,
where p := 12 − ε, Sn represents the player’s profit after n games when playing
gameA repeatedly. Finally, with the role of P played by PC := γPA+(1−γ)PB,
where 0 < γ < 1, Sn represents the player’s profit after n games when playing
the mixed game C := γA+ (1− γ)B repeatedly. In summary, all three capital-
dependent games are described by the same stochastic model with a suitable
choice of parameters.
Similarly, the history-dependent games fit into the same framework, as do
the “primary” Parrondo games of Cleuren and Van den Broeck (2004).
Thus, our initial goal is to analyze the asymptotic behavior of Sn under
the conditions of the second paragraph of this section. We begin by assuming
that X0 has distribution pi, so that {Xn}n≥0 and hence {ξn}n≥1 are stationary
sequences, although we will weaken this assumption later.
1In the physics literature the one-step transition matrix is often written in transposed form,
that is, with column sums equal to 1. We do not follow that convention here. More precisely,
here Pij := P(Xn = j | Xn−1 = i).
2Coincidentally, this is the payoff matrix for the classic game stone-scissors-paper. How-
ever, Parrondo’s games, as originally formulated, are games of chance, not games of strategy,
and so are outside the purview of game theory (in the sense of von Neumann).
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We claim that the conditions of the stationary, strong mixing central limit
theorem apply to {ξn}n≥1. To say that {ξn}n≥1 has the strong mixing property
(or is strongly mixing) means that α(n)→ 0 as n→∞, where
α(n) := sup
m
sup
E∈σ(ξ1,...,ξm), F∈σ(ξm+n,ξm+n+1,...)
|P(E ∩ F )− P(E)P(F )|.
A version of the theorem for bounded sequences (Bradley 2007, Theorem 10.3)
suffices here. That version requires that
∑
n≥1 α(n) < ∞. In our setting,
{Xn}n≥0 is strongly mixing with a geometric rate (Billingsley 1995, Example
27.6), hence so is {ξn}n≥1. Since ξ1, ξ2, . . . are bounded by max |w|, it follows
that
σ2 := Var(ξ1) + 2
∞∑
m=1
Cov(ξ1, ξm+1)
converges absolutely. For the theorem to apply, it suffices to assume that σ2 > 0.
Let us evaluate the mean and variance parameters of the central limit theo-
rem. First,
µ := E[ξ1] =
∑
i
P(X0 = i)E[w(X0, X1) | X0 = i] =
∑
i,j
piiPijw(i, j) (6)
and
Var(ξ1) = E[ξ
2
1 ]− (E[ξ1])2 =
∑
i,j
piiPijw(i, j)
2 −
(∑
i,j
piiPijw(i, j)
)2
.
To evaluate Cov(ξ1, ξm+1), we first find
E[ξ1ξm+1] =
∑
i
piiE[w(X0, X1)E[w(Xm, Xm+1) | X0, X1] | X0 = i]
=
∑
i,j
piiPijw(i, j)E[w(Xm, Xm+1) | X1 = j]
=
∑
i,j,k,l
piiPijw(i, j)(P
m−1)jkPklw(k, l),
from which it follows that
Cov(ξ1, ξm+1) =
∑
i,j,k,l
piiPijw(i, j)[(P
m−1)jk − pik]Pklw(k, l).
We conclude that
∞∑
m=1
Cov(ξ1, ξm+1) =
∑
i,j,k,l
piiPijw(i, j)(zjk − pik)Pklw(k, l),
where Z = (zij) is the fundamental matrix associated with P (Kemeny and
Snell 1960, p. 75).
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In more detail, we let Π denote the square matrix each of whose rows is pi,
and we find that
∞∑
m=1
(Pm−1 −Π) = I −Π+
∞∑
n=1
(P n −Π) = Z −Π,
where
Z := I +
∞∑
n=1
(P n −Π) = (I − (P −Π))−1; (7)
for the last equality, see Kemeny and Snell (loc. cit.). Therefore,
σ2 =
∑
i,j
piiPijw(i, j)
2 −
(∑
i,j
piiPijw(i, j)
)2
+ 2
∑
i,j,k,l
piiPijw(i, j)(zjk − pik)Pklw(k, l). (8)
A referee has pointed out that these formulas can be written more concisely
using matrix notation. Denote by P ′ (resp., P ′′) the matrix whose (i, j)th
entry is Pijw(i, j) (resp., Pijw(i, j)
2), and let 1 := (1, 1, . . . , 1)T. Then
µ = piP ′1 and σ2 = piP ′′1− (piP ′1)2 + 2piP ′(Z −Π)P ′1. (9)
If σ2 > 0, then (Bradley 2007, Proposition 8.3)
lim
n→∞
n−1Var(Sn) = σ
2
and the central limit theorem applies, that is, (Sn − nµ)/
√
nσ2 →d N(0, 1). If
we strengthen the assumption that
∑
n≥1 α(n) < ∞ by assuming that α(n) =
O(n−(1+δ)), where 0 < δ < 1, we have (Bradley 2007, proof of Lemma 10.4)
E[(Sn − nµ)4] = O(n3−δ),
hence by the Borel–Cantelli lemma it follows that Sn/n→ µ a.s. In other words,
the strong law of large numbers applies.
Finally, we claim that, if µ = 0 and σ2 > 0, then
−∞ = lim inf
n→∞
Sn < lim sup
n→∞
Sn =∞ a.s. (10)
Indeed, {ξn}n≥1 is stationary and strongly mixing, hence its future tail σ-field
is trivial (Bradley 2007, p. 60), in the sense that every event has probability 0
or 1. It follows that P(lim infn→∞ Sn = −∞) is 0 or 1. Since µ = 0 and σ2 > 0,
we can invoke the central limit theorem to conclude that this probability is 1.
Similarly, we get P(lim supn→∞ Sn =∞) = 1.
Each of these derivations required that the sequence {ξn}n≥1 be stationary,
an assumption that holds if X0 has distribution pi, but in fact the distribution
of X0 can be arbitrary, and {ξn}n≥1 need not be stationary.
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Theorem 1. Let µ and σ2 be as in (6) and (8). Under the assumptions of the
second paragraph of this section, but with the distribution of X0 arbitrary,
lim
n→∞
n−1E[Sn] = µ and
Sn
n
→ µ a.s. (11)
and, if σ2 > 0,
lim
n→∞
n−1Var(Sn) = σ
2 and
Sn − nµ√
nσ2
→d N(0, 1). (12)
If µ = 0 and σ2 > 0, then (10) holds.
Remark. Assume that σ2 > 0. It follows that, if Sn is the player’s cumulative
profit after n games for each n ≥ 1, then the game (or mixture or pattern of
games) is losing if µ < 0, winning if µ > 0, and fair if µ = 0. (See Section 1 for
the definitions of these three terms.)
Proof. It will suffice to treat the case X0 = i0 ∈ Σ, and then use this case to
prove the general case. Let {Xn}n≥0 be a Markov chain in Σ with one-step
transition matrix P and initial distribution pi, so that {ξn}n≥1 is stationary, as
above. Let N := min{n ≥ 0 : Xn = i0}, and define
Xˆn := XN+n, n ≥ 0.
Then {Xˆn}n≥0 is a Markov chain in Σ with one-step transition matrix P and
initial state Xˆ0 = i0. We can define {ξˆn}n≥1 and {Sˆn}n≥1 in terms of it by
analogy with (3) and (4). If n ≥ N , then
Sˆn − Sn = ξˆ1 + · · ·+ ξˆn − (ξ1 + · · ·+ ξn)
= ξˆ1 + · · ·+ ξˆn−N + ξˆn−N+1 + · · ·+ ξˆn
− (ξ1 + · · ·+ ξN + ξN+1 + · · ·+ ξn)
= ξˆn−N+1 + · · ·+ ξˆn − (ξ1 + · · ·+ ξN ),
and Sˆn − Sn is bounded by 2N max |w|. Thus, if we divide by n or
√
nσ2, the
result tends to 0 a.s. as n→∞. We get the SLLN and the CLT with Sˆn in place
of Sn, via this coupling of the two sequences. We also get the last conclusion in
a similar way. The first equation in (11) follows from the second using bounded
convergence. Finally, the random variable N has finite moments (Durrett 1996,
Chapter 5, Exercise 2.5). The first equation in (12) therefore follows from our
coupling.
A well-known (Bradley 2007, pp. 36–37) nontrivial example for which σ2 = 0
is the case in which Σ ⊂ R and w(i, j) = j−i for all i, j ∈ Σ. Then Sn = Xn−X0
(a telescoping sum) for all n ≥ 1, hence µ = 0 and σ2 = 0 by Theorem 1.
However, it may be of interest to confirm these conclusions using only the
mean, variance, and covariance formulas above. We calculate
µ := E[ξ1] =
∑
i,j
piiPij(j − i) =
∑
j
pijj −
∑
i
piii = 0,
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Var(ξ1) =
∑
i,j
piiPij(j − i)2 − µ2 = 2
∑
i
piii
2 − 2
∑
i,j
piiPijij, (13)
and
∞∑
m=1
Cov(ξ1, ξm+1) =
∑
i,j,k,l
piiPij(j − i)zjkPkl(l − k)
=
∑
i,j,k,l
piiPijzjkPkljl−
∑
i,j,k,l
piiPijzjkPkljk
−
∑
i,j,k,l
piiPijzjkPklil +
∑
i,j,k,l
piiPijzjkPklik
=
∑
j,k,l
pijzjkPkljl −
∑
j,k
pijzjkjk
−
∑
i,j,k,l
piiPijzjkPklil +
∑
i,j,k
piiPijzjkik. (14)
Since Z = (I− (P −Π))−1, we can multiply (I−P +Π)Z = I on the right by
P and use ΠZP = ΠP = Π to get PZP = ZP +Π− P . This implies that∑
i,j,k,l
piiPijzjkPklil =
∑
i,k,l
piizikPklil +
∑
i,l
piipilil −
∑
i,l
piiPilil.
From the fact that PZ = Z +Π− I, we also obtain∑
i,j,k
piiPijzjkik =
∑
i,k
piizikik +
∑
i,k
piipikik −
∑
i
piii
2.
Substituting in (14) gives
∞∑
m=1
Cov(ξ1, ξm+1) =
∑
i,l
piiPilil −
∑
i
piii
2,
and this, together with (13), implies that σ2 = 0.
3 Mixtures of capital-dependent games
The Markov chain underlying the capital-dependent Parrondo games has state
space Σ = {0, 1, 2} and one-step transition matrix of the form
P :=

 0 p0 1− p01− p1 0 p1
p2 1− p2 0

 , (15)
where p0, p1, p2 ∈ (0, 1). It is irreducible and aperiodic. The payoff matrix W
is as in (5).
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It will be convenient below to define qi := 1 − pi for i = 0, 1, 2. Now, the
unique stationary distribution pi = (pi0, pi1, pi2) has the form
pi0 = (1 − p1q2)/d, pi1 = (1− p2q0)/d, pi2 = (1− p0q1)/d,
where d := 2 + p0p1p2 + q0q1q2. Further, the fundamental matrix Z = (zij) is
easy to evaluate (e.g., z00 = pi0 + [pi1(1 + p1) + pi2(1 + q2)]/d).
We conclude that {ξn}n≥1 satisfies the SLLN with
µ =
2∑
i=0
pii(pi − qi)
and the CLT with the same µ and with
σ2 = 1− µ2 + 2
2∑
i=0
2∑
k=0
pii[pi(z[i+1],k − pik)− qi(z[i−1],k − pik)](pk − qk),
where [j] ∈ {0, 1, 2} satisfies j ≡ [j] (mod 3), at least if σ2 > 0.
We now apply these results to the capital-dependent Parrondo games. Al-
though actually much simpler, game A fits into this framework with one-step
transition matrix PA defined by (15) with
p0 = p1 = p2 :=
1
2
− ε,
where ε > 0 is a small bias parameter. In game B, it is typically assumed that,
ignoring the bias parameter, the one-step transition matrix PB is defined by
(15) with
p1 = p2 and µ = 0.
These two constraints determine a one-parameter family of probabilities given
by
p1 = p2 =
1
1 +
√
p0/(1− p0)
. (16)
To eliminate the square root, we reparametrize the probabilities in terms of
ρ > 0. Restoring the bias parameter, game B has one-step transition matrix
PB defined by (15) with
p0 :=
ρ2
1 + ρ2
− ε, p1 = p2 := 1
1 + ρ
− ε, (17)
which includes (1) when ρ = 1/3. Finally, game C := γA + (1 − γ)B is a
mixture (0 < γ < 1) of the two games, hence has one-step transition matrix
PC := γPA + (1− γ)PB, which can also be defined by (15) with
p0 := γ
1
2
+ (1− γ) ρ
2
1 + ρ2
− ε, p1 = p2 := γ 1
2
+ (1 − γ) 1
1 + ρ
− ε.
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Let us denote the mean µ for game A by µA(ε), to emphasize the game as
well as its dependence on ε. Similarly, we denote the variance σ2 for game A
by σ2A(ε). Analogous notation applies to games B and C. We obtain, for game
A, µA(ε) = −2ε and σ2A(ε) = 1− 4ε2; for game B,
µB(ε) = −3(1 + 2ρ+ 6ρ
2 + 2ρ3 + ρ4)
2(1 + ρ+ ρ2)2
ε+O(ε2)
and
σ2B(ε) =
(
3ρ
1 + ρ+ ρ2
)2
+O(ε);
and for game C,
µC(ε) =
3γ(1− γ)(2− γ)(1− ρ)3(1 + ρ)
8(1 + ρ+ ρ2)2 + γ(2− γ)(1− ρ)2(1 + 4ρ+ ρ2) +O(ε)
and
σ2C(ε) = 1− µC(0)2 − 32(1− γ)2(1− ρ3)2[16(1 + ρ+ ρ2)2(1 + 4ρ+ ρ2)
+ 8γ(1− ρ)2(1 + 4ρ+ ρ2)2 + 24γ2(1− ρ)2(1− ρ− 6ρ2 − ρ3 + ρ4)
− γ3(4− γ)(1− ρ)4(7 + 16ρ+ 7ρ2)]
/[8(1 + ρ+ ρ2)2 + γ(2− γ)(1− ρ)2(1 + 4ρ+ ρ2)]3 +O(ε).
One can check that σ2C(0) < 1 for all ρ 6= 1 and γ ∈ (0, 1).
The formula for σ2B(0) was found by Percus and Percus (2002) in a different
form. We prefer the form given here because it tells us immediately that game
B has smaller variance than game A for each ρ 6= 1, provided ε is sufficiently
small. With ρ = 1/3 and ε = 1/200, Harmer and Abbott (2002, Fig. 5) inferred
this from a simulation.
The formula for µC(0) was obtained by Berresford and Rockett (2003) in a
different form. We prefer the form given here because it makes the following
conclusion transparent.
Theorem 2 (Pyke 2003). Let ρ > 0 and let games A and B be as above but
with the bias parameter absent. If γ ∈ (0, 1) and C := γA + (1 − γ)B, then
µC(0) > 0 for all ρ ∈ (0, 1), µC(0) = 0 for ρ = 1, and µC(0) < 0 for all ρ > 1.
Assuming (17) with ε = 0, the condition ρ < 1 is equivalent to p0 <
1
2 .
Clearly, the Parrondo effect appears (with the bias parameter present) if
and only if µC(0) > 0. A reverse Parrondo effect, in which two winning games
combine to lose, appears (with a negative bias parameter present) if and only if
µC(0) < 0.
Corollary 3 (Pyke 2003). Let games A and B be as above (with the bias pa-
rameter present). If ρ ∈ (0, 1) and γ ∈ (0, 1), then there exists ε0 > 0, de-
pending on ρ and γ, such that Parrondo’s paradox holds for games A, B, and
C := γA + (1 − γ)B, that is, µA(ε) < 0, µB(ε) < 0, and µC(ε) > 0, whenever
0 < ε < ε0.
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The theorem and corollary are special cases of results of Pyke. In his form-
ulation, the modulo 3 condition in the definition of game B is replaced by a
modulom condition, wherem ≥ 3, and game A is replaced by a game analogous
to game B but with a different parameter ρ0. Pyke’s condition is equivalent to
0 < ρ < ρ0 ≤ 1. We have assumed m = 3 and ρ0 = 1.
We would like to point out a useful property of game B. We assume ε = 0
and we temporarily denote {Xn}n≥0, {ξn}n≥1, and {Sn}n≥1 by {Xn(ρ)}n≥0,
{ξn(ρ)}n≥1, and {Sn(ρ)}n≥1 to emphasize their dependence on ρ. Similarly,
we temporarily denote µB(0) and σ
2
B(0) by µB(ρ, 0) and σ
2
B(ρ, 0). Replacing
ρ by 1/ρ has the effect of changing the win probabilities p0 = ρ
2/(1 + ρ2) and
p1 = 1/(1 + ρ) to the loss probabilities 1 − p0 and 1 − p1, and vice versa.
Therefore, given ρ ∈ (0, 1), we expect that
ξn(1/ρ) = −ξn(ρ), Sn(1/ρ) = −Sn(ρ), n ≥ 1,
a property that is in fact realized by coupling the Markov chains {Xn(ρ)}n≥0
and {Xn(1/ρ)}n≥0 so that Xn(1/ρ) ≡ −Xn(ρ) (mod 3) for all n ≥ 1. It follows
that
µB(1/ρ, 0) = −µB(ρ, 0) and σ2B(1/ρ, 0) = σ2B(ρ, 0). (18)
The same argument gives (18) for game C. The reader may have noticed that
the formulas derived above for µB(0) and σ
2
B(0), as well as those for µC(0) and
σ2C(0), satisfy (18).
When ρ = 1/3, the mean and variance formulas simplify to
µB(ε) = −294
169
ε+O(ε2) and σ2B(ε) =
81
169
+O(ε)
and, if γ = 12 as well,
µC(ε) =
18
709
+O(ε) and σ2C(ε) =
311313105
356400829
+O(ε).
4 Mixtures of history-dependent games
The Markov chain underlying the history-dependent Parrondo games has state
space Σ = {0, 1, 2, 3} and one-step transition matrix of the form
P :=


1− p0 p0 0 0
0 0 1− p1 p1
1− p2 p2 0 0
0 0 1− p3 p3

 , (19)
where p0, p1, p2, p3 ∈ (0, 1). Think of the states of Σ in binary form: 00, 01, 10,
11. They represent, respectively, loss-loss, loss-win, win-loss, and win-win for
the results of the two preceding games, with the second-listed result being the
11
more recent one. The Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic. The payoff
matrix W is given by
W :=


−1 1 0 0
0 0 −1 1
−1 1 0 0
0 0 −1 1

 .
It will be convenient below to define qi := 1 − pi for i = 0, 1, 2, 3. Now, the
unique stationary distribution pi = (pi0, pi1, pi2, pi3) has the form
pi0 = q2q3/d, pi1 = p0q3/d, pi2 = p0q3/d, pi3 = p0p1/d,
where d := p0p1+2p0q3+ q2q3. Further, the fundamental matrix Z = (zij) can
be evaluated with some effort (e.g., z00 = pi0 + [pi1(p1 +2q3) + pi2(p1p2 + p2q3 +
q3) + pi3(p1p2 + p2q3 + q2 + q3)]/d).
We conclude that {ξn}n≥1 satisfies the SLLN with
µ =
3∑
i=0
pii(pi − qi)
and the CLT with the same µ and with
σ2 = 1− µ2 + 2
3∑
i=0
3∑
k=0
pii[pi(z[2i+1],k − pik)− qi(z[2i],k − pik)](pk − qk),
where [j] ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} satisfies j ≡ [j] (mod 4), at least if σ2 > 0.
We now apply these results to the history-dependent Parrondo games. Al-
though actually much simpler, game A fits into this framework with one-step
transition matrix PA defined by (19) with
p0 = p1 = p2 = p3 :=
1
2
− ε,
where ε > 0 is a small bias parameter. In game B, it is typically assumed that,
ignoring the bias parameter, the one-step transition matrix PB is defined by
(19) with
p1 = p2 and µ = 0.
These two constraints determine a two-parameter family of probabilities given
by
p1 = p2 and p3 = 1− p0p1
1− p1 . (20)
We reparametrize the probabilities in terms of κ > 0 and λ > 0 (with λ < 1+κ).
Restoring the bias parameter, gameB has one-step transition matrix PB defined
by (19) with
p0 :=
1
1 + κ
− ε, p1 = p2 := λ
1 + λ
− ε, p3 := 1− λ
1 + κ
− ε, (21)
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which includes (2) when κ = 1/9 and λ = 1/3. Finally, game C := γA+(1−γ)B
is a mixture (0 < γ < 1) of the two games, hence has one-step transition matrix
PC := γPA + (1− γ)PB, which also has the form (19).
We obtain, for game A, µA(ε) = −2ε and σ2A(ε) = 1− 4ε2; for game B,
µB(ε) = − (1 + κ)(1 + λ)
2λ
ε+O(ε2)
and
σ2B(ε) =
(1 + κ)(1 + κ+ κλ+ κλ2)
λ(1 + λ)(2 + κ+ λ)
+O(ε);
and for game C,
µC(ε) = γ(1− γ)(1 + κ)(λ− κ)(1− λ)/[2γ(2− γ) + γ(5− γ)κ
+ (8− 9γ + 3γ2)λ + γ(1 + γ)κ2 + 4κλ+ (1− γ)(4− γ)λ2
+ γ(1 + γ)κ2λ+ 3γ(1− γ)κλ2] +O(ε)
and
σ2C(ε) = 1− µC(0)2 + 8(1− γ)[2− γ(1− κ)][2λ+ γ(1 + κ− 2λ)]
· [2λ(2 + κ+ λ)2(1 + 2κ− 2λ+ κ2 − 3λ2 + κ2λ− λ3 + κ2λ2)
+ γ(2 + κ+ λ)(2 + 5κ− 11λ+ 4κ2 − 16κλ+ 2λ2 + κ3
− 3κ2λ− 2κλ2 + 18λ3 + 2κ3λ+ 10κ2λ2 − 10κλ3 + 12λ4
+ 8κ3λ2 − 8κ2λ3 − 13κλ4 + 3λ5 + 2κ3λ3 − 6κ2λ4 − 2κλ5
+ κ3λ4 + κ2λ5)− γ2(6 + 14κ− 14λ+ 9κ2 − 24κλ− 9λ2
− 18κ2λ+ 2κλ2 + 16λ3 − κ4 − 12κ3λ+ 33κ2λ2 + 16λ4
− 4κ4λ+ 16κ3λ2 + 12κ2λ3 − 30κλ4 + 6λ5 − 9κ2λ4 − 16κλ5
+ λ6 − 4κ4λ3 + 6κ2λ5 − 2κλ6 − κ4λ4 + 4κ3λ5 + 3κ2λ6)
+ 2γ3(1 − κλ)2(1 + κ− λ− λ2)2]
/{(1 + λ)[2γ(2− γ) + γ(5− γ)κ+ (8 − 9γ + 3γ2)λ+ γ(1 + γ)κ2
+ 4κλ+ (1 − γ)(4− γ)λ2 + γ(1 + γ)κ2λ+ 3γ(1− γ)κλ2]3}
+O(ε).
By inspection, we deduce the following conclusion.
Theorem 4. Let κ > 0, λ > 0, and λ < 1 + κ, and let games A and B be as
above but with the bias parameter absent. If γ ∈ (0, 1) and C := γA+(1− γ)B,
then µC(0) > 0 whenever κ < λ < 1 or κ > λ > 1, µC(0) = 0 whenever κ = λ
or λ = 1, and µC(0) < 0 whenever λ < min(κ, 1) or λ > max(κ, 1).
Assuming (21) with ε = 0, the condition κ < λ < 1 is equivalent to
p0 + p1 > 1 and p1 = p2 <
1
2
,
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whereas the condition κ > λ > 1 is equivalent to
p0 + p1 < 1 and p1 = p2 >
1
2
.
Again, the Parrondo effect is present if and only if µC(0) > 0.
Corollary 5. Let games A and B be as above (with the bias parameter present).
If 0 < κ < λ < 1 or κ > λ > 1, and if γ ∈ (0, 1), then there exists ε0 > 0,
depending on κ, λ, and γ, such that Parrondo’s paradox holds for games A,
B, and C := γA + (1 − γ)B, that is, µA(ε) < 0, µB(ε) < 0, and µC(ε) > 0,
whenever 0 < ε < ε0.
When κ = 1/9 and λ = 1/3, the mean and variance formulas simplify to
µB(ε) = −20
9
ε+ O(ε2) and σ2B(ε) =
235
198
+O(ε)
and, if γ = 12 as well,
µC(ε) =
5
429
+O(ε) and σ2C(ε) =
25324040
26317863
+O(ε).
Here, in contrast to the capital-dependent games, the variance of game B is
greater than that of game A. This conclusion, however, is parameter dependent.
5 Nonrandom patterns of games
We also want to consider nonrandom patterns of games of the form ArBs, in
which game A is played r times, then game B is played s times, where r and s
are positive integers. Such a pattern is denoted in the literature by [r, s].
Associated with the games are one-step transition matrices for Markov chains
in a finite state space Σ, which we will denote by PA and PB, and a function
w : Σ × Σ 7→ R. We assume that PA and PB are irreducible and aperiodic,
as are P := P rAP
s
B, P
r−1
A P
s
BPA, . . . , P
s
BP
r
A, . . . , PBP
r
AP
s−1
B (the r + s cyclic
permutations of P rAP
s
B). Let us denote the unique stationary distribution asso-
ciated with P by pi = (pii)i∈Σ. The driving Markov chain {Xn}n≥0 is time-
inhomogeneous, with one-step transition matrices PA,PA, . . . ,PA (r times),
PB,PB, . . . ,PB (s times), PA,PA, . . . ,PA (r times), PB,PB, . . . ,PB (s times),
and so on. Now define {ξn}n≥1 and {Sn}n≥1 by (3) and (4). What is the
asymptotic behavior of Sn as n→∞?
Let us give X0 distribution pi, at least for now. The time-inhomogeneous
Markov chain {Xn}n≥0 is of course not stationary, so we define the (time-
homogeneous) Markov chain {Xn}n≥0 by
X1 := (X0, X1, . . . , Xr+s),
X2 := (Xr+s, Xr+s+1, . . . , X2(r+s)), (22)
X3 := (X2(r+s), X2(r+s)+1, . . . , X3(r+s)),
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...
and we note that this is a stationary Markov chain in a subset of Σr+s+1.
(The overlap between successive vectors is intentional.) We assume that it is
irreducible and aperiodic in that subset, hence it is strongly mixing. Therefore,
(ξ1, . . . , ξr+s), (ξr+s+1, . . . , ξ2(r+s)), (ξ2(r+s)+1, . . . , ξ3(r+s)), . . . is itself a station-
ary, strongly mixing sequence, and we can apply the stationary, strong mixing
CLT to the sequence
η1 := ξ1 + · · ·+ ξr+s,
η2 := ξr+s+1 + · · ·+ ξ2(r+s), (23)
η3 := ξ2(r+s)+1 + · · ·+ ξ3(r+s),
...
We denote by µˆ and σˆ2 the mean and variance parameters for this sequence.
The mean and variance parameters µ and σ2 for the original sequence
ξ1, ξ2, . . . can be obtained from these. Indeed,
µ := lim
n→∞
1
(r + s)n
E[S(r+s)n] = lim
n→∞
1
(r + s)n
E[η1 + · · ·+ ηn] = µˆ
r + s
,
where µˆ := E[η1], and
σ2 := lim
n→∞
1
(r + s)n
Var(S(r+s)n) = lim
n→∞
1
(r + s)n
Var(η1 + · · ·+ ηn) = σˆ
2
r + s
,
where
σˆ2 := Var(η1) + 2
∞∑
m=1
Cov(η1, ηm+1).
It remains to evaluate these variances and covariances.
First,
µ =
1
r + s
( r−1∑
u=0
∑
i,j
(piP uA)i(PA)ijw(i, j) +
s−1∑
v=0
∑
i,j
(piP rAP
v
B)i(PB)ijw(i, j)
)
.
(24)
This formula for µ is equivalent to one found by Kay and Johnson (2003) in the
history-dependent setting.
Next,
Var(η1)
=
r−1∑
u=0
Var(ξu+1) +
s−1∑
v=0
Var(ξr+v+1) + 2
∑
0≤u<v≤r−1
Cov(ξu+1, ξv+1)
+ 2
r−1∑
u=0
s−1∑
v=0
Cov(ξu+1, ξr+v+1) + 2
∑
0≤u<v≤s−1
Cov(ξr+u+1, ξr+v+1)
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=r−1∑
u=0
[∑
i,j
(piP uA)i(PA)ijw(i, j)
2 −
(∑
i,j
(piP uA)i(PA)ijw(i, j)
)2]
+
s−1∑
v=0
[∑
i,j
(piP rAP
v
B)i(PB)ijw(i, j)
2 −
(∑
i,j
(piP rAP
v
B)i(PB)ijw(i, j)
)2]
+ 2
∑
0≤u<v≤r−1
∑
i,j,k,l
(piP uA)i(PA)ijw(i, j)
· [(P v−u−1A )jk − (piP vA)k](PA)klw(k, l)
+ 2
r−1∑
u=0
s−1∑
v=0
∑
i,j,k,l
(piP uA)i(PA)ijw(i, j)
· [(P r−u−1A P vB)jk − (piP rAP vB)k](PB)klw(k, l)
+ 2
∑
0≤u<v≤s−1
∑
i,j,k,l
(piP rAP
u
B)i(PB)ijw(i, j)
· [(P v−u−1B )jk − (piP rAP vB)k](PB)klw(k, l). (25)
Furthermore,
Cov(η1, ηm+1)
= Cov(ξ1 + · · ·+ ξr+s, ξm(r+s)+1 + · · ·+ ξ(m+1)(r+s))
=
r−1∑
u=0
r−1∑
v=0
Cov(ξu+1, ξm(r+s)+v+1) +
r−1∑
u=0
s−1∑
v=0
Cov(ξu+1, ξm(r+s)+r+v+1)
+
s−1∑
u=0
r−1∑
v=0
Cov(ξr+u+1, ξm(r+s)+v+1) +
s−1∑
u=0
s−1∑
v=0
Cov(ξr+u+1, ξm(r+s)+r+v+1)
=
r−1∑
u=0
r−1∑
v=0
∑
i,j,k,l
(piP uA)i(PA)ijw(i, j)
· [(P r−u−1A P sBPm−1P vA)jk − (piP vA)k](PA)klw(k, l)
+
r−1∑
u=0
s−1∑
v=0
∑
i,j,k,l
(piP uA)i(PA)ijw(i, j)
· [(P r−u−1A P sBPm−1P rAP vB)jk − (piP rAP vB)k](PB)klw(k, l)
+
s−1∑
u=0
r−1∑
v=0
∑
i,j,k,l
(piP rAP
u
B)i(PB)ijw(i, j)
· [(P s−u−1B Pm−1P vA)jk − (piP vA)k](PA)klw(k, l)
+
s−1∑
u=0
s−1∑
v=0
∑
i,j,k,l
(piP rAP
u
B)i(PB)ijw(i, j)
· [(P s−u−1B Pm−1P rAP vB)jk − (piP rAP vB)k](PB)klw(k, l).
Consider the factor (P r−u−1A P
s
BP
m−1P vA)jk − (piP vA)k in the first sum on the
right, for example. With Π denoting the square matrix each of whose rows is
pi, we can rewrite this as
(P r−u−1A P
s
BP
m−1P vA)jk − (P r−u−1A P sBΠP vA)jk
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= [P r−u−1A P
s
B(P
m−1 −Π)P vA]jk
Thus, summing over m ≥ 1, we get
∞∑
m=1
Cov(η1, ηm+1)
=
r−1∑
u=0
r−1∑
v=0
∑
i,j,k,l
(piP uA)i(PA)ijw(i, j)
· [P r−u−1A P sB(Z −Π)P vA]jk(PA)klw(k, l)
+
r−1∑
u=0
s−1∑
v=0
∑
i,j,k,l
(piP uA)i(PA)ijw(i, j)
· [P r−u−1A P sB(Z −Π)P rAP vB]jk(PB)klw(k, l)
+
s−1∑
u=0
r−1∑
v=0
∑
i,j,k,l
(piP rAP
u
B)i(PB)ijw(i, j)
· [P s−u−1B (Z −Π)P vA]jk(PA)klw(k, l)
+
s−1∑
u=0
s−1∑
v=0
∑
i,j,k,l
(piP rAP
u
B)i(PB)ijw(i, j)
· [P s−u−1B (Z −Π)P rAP vB]jk(PB)klw(k, l), (26)
where Z is the fundamental matrix associated with P := P rAP
s
B . We conclude
that
σ2 =
1
r + s
(
Var(η1) + 2
∞∑
m=1
Cov(η1, ηm+1)
)
, (27)
which relies on (25) and (26).
We summarize the results of this section in the following theorem.
Theorem 6. Let µ and σ2 be as in (24) and (27). Under the assumptions of
the second paragraph of this section, but with the distribution of X0 arbitrary,
lim
n→∞
n−1E[Sn] = µ and
Sn
n
→ µ a.s.
and, if σ2 > 0,
lim
n→∞
n−1Var(Sn) = σ
2 and
Sn − nµ√
nσ2
→d N(0, 1).
If µ = 0 and σ2 > 0, then (10) holds.
Remark. It follows that a pattern is losing, winning, or fair according to whether
µ < 0, µ > 0, or µ = 0.
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1, except that N := min{n ≥
0 : Xn = i0, n is divisible by r + s}.
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In the examples to which we will be applying the above mean and variance
formulas, additional simplifications will occur because PA has a particularly
simple form and PB has a spectral representation. Denote by P
′
A the matrix
with (i, j)th entry (PA)ijw(i, j), and assume that P
′
A has row sums equal to
0. Denote by P ′B the matrix with (i, j)th entry (PB)ijw(i, j), and define ζ :=
P ′B(1, 1, . . . , 1)
T to be the vector of row sums of P ′B . Further, let t := |Σ|
and suppose that PB has eigenvalues 1, e1, . . . , et−1 and corresponding linearly
independent right eigenvectors r0, r1, . . . , rt−1. Put D := diag(1, e1, . . . , et−1)
and R := (r0, r1, . . . , rt−1). Then the rows of L := R
−1 are left eigenvectors
and P vB = RD
vL for all v ≥ 0. Finally, with
Dv := diag
(
v,
1− ev1
1− e1 , . . . ,
1− evt−1
1− et−1
)
,
we have I + PB + · · · + P v−1B = RDvL for all v ≥ 1. Additional notation
includes pis,r for the unique stationary distribution of P
s
BP
r
A, and pi as before
for the unique stationary distribution of P := P rAP
s
B. Notice that piP
r
A = pis,r.
Finally, we assume as well that w(i, j) = ±1 whenever (PA)ij > 0 or (PB)ij > 0.
These assumptions allow us to write (24) as
µ = (r + s)−1pis,rRDsLζ, (28)
and similarly (25) and (26) become
Var(η1) = r + s−
s−1∑
v=0
(pis,rP
v
Bζ)
2 + 2
r−1∑
u=0
piP uAP
′
AP
r−u−1
A RDsLζ (29)
+ 2
s−1∑
v=1
v−1∑
u=0
pis,rP
u
BP
′
BP
v−u−1
B ζ − 2
s−1∑
v=1
(pis,rRDvLζ)(pis,rP
v
Bζ),
and
∞∑
m=1
Cov(η1, ηm+1) =
r−1∑
u=0
piP uAP
′
AP
r−u−1
A P
s
B(Z −Π)P rARDsLζ (30)
+
s−1∑
u=0
pis,rP
u
BP
′
BP
s−u−1
B (Z −Π)P rARDsLζ.
A referee has suggested an alternative approach to the results of this section
that has certain advantages. Instead of starting with a time-inhomogeneous
Markov chain in Σ, we begin with the (time-homogeneous) Markov chain in the
product space Σ¯ := {0, 1, . . . , r + s− 1} × Σ with transition probabilities
(i, j) 7→ (i + 1 mod r + s, k) with probability
{
(PA)jk if 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1,
(PB)jk if r ≤ i ≤ r + s− 1.
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It is irreducible and periodic with period r+ s. Ordering the states of Σ¯ lexico-
graphically, we can write the one-step transition matrix in block form as
P¯ :=


0 P0 0 · · · 0
0 0 P1 0
...
...
. . .
0 0 0 Pr+s−2
Pr+s−1 0 0 · · · 0

 ,
where Pi := PA for 0 ≤ i ≤ r − 1 and Pi := PB for r ≤ i ≤ r + s −
1. With pi as above, the unique stationary distribution for P¯ is p¯i := (r +
s)−1(pi0,pi1, . . . ,pir+s−1), where pi0 := pi and pii := pii−1Pi−1 for 1 ≤ i ≤
r + s − 1. Using the idea in (22) and (23), we can deduce the strong mixing
property and the central limit theorem. The mean and variance parameters are
as in (9) but with bars on the matrices. Of course, Z¯ := (I − (P¯ − Π¯))−1, Π¯
being the square matrix each of whose rows is p¯i; P¯ ′ is as P¯ but with P ′A and
P ′B in place of PA and PB ; and similarly for P¯
′′.
The principal advantage of this approach is the simplicity of the formulas for
the mean and variance parameters. Another advantage is that patterns other
than those of the form [r, s] can be treated just as easily. The only drawback
is that, in the context of our two models, the matrices are no longer 3 × 3 or
4× 4 but rather 3(r+ s)× 3(r+ s) and 4(r+ s)× 4(r+ s). In other words, the
formulas (28)–(30), although lacking elegance, are more user-friendly.
6 Patterns of capital-dependent games
Let games A and B be as in Section 3; see especially (17). Both games are
losing. In this section we show that, for every ρ ∈ (0, 1), and for every pair of
positive integers r and s except for r = s = 1, the pattern [r, s], which stands
for r plays of game A followed by s plays of game B, is winning for sufficiently
small ε > 0. Notice that it will suffice to treat the case ε = 0.
We begin by finding a formula for µ[r,s](0), the asymptotic mean per game
played of the player’s cumulative profit for the pattern [r, s], assuming ε = 0.
Recall that PA is given by (15) with p0 = p1 = p2 :=
1
2 , and PB is given by
(15) with p0 := ρ
2/(1 + ρ2) and p1 = p2 := 1/(1 + ρ), where ρ > 0. First, we
can prove by induction that
P rA =

 1− 2ar ar arar 1− 2ar ar
ar ar 1− 2ar

 , r ≥ 1,
where
ar :=
1− (− 12 )r
3
. (31)
Next, with S :=
√
(1 + ρ2)(1 + 4ρ+ ρ2), the nonunit eigenvalues of PB are
e1 := −1
2
+
(1− ρ)S
2(1 + ρ)(1 + ρ2)
, e2 := −1
2
− (1− ρ)S
2(1 + ρ)(1 + ρ2)
,
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and we define the diagonal matrixD := diag(1, e1, e2). The corresponding right
eigenvectors
r0 :=

11
1

 , r1 :=

 (1 + ρ)(1− ρ2 − S)2 + ρ+ 2ρ2 + ρ3 + ρS
−(1 + 2ρ+ ρ2 + 2ρ3 − S)

 ,
r2 :=

 (1 + ρ)(1− ρ2 + S)2 + ρ+ 2ρ2 + ρ3 − ρS
−(1 + 2ρ+ ρ2 + 2ρ3 + S)

 ,
are linearly independent for all ρ > 0 (including ρ = 1), so we define R :=
(r0, r1, r2) and L := R
−1.
Then
P sB = RD
sL, s ≥ 0,
which leads to an explicit formula for P sBP
r
A, from which we can compute its
unique stationary distribution pis,r as a left eigenvector corresponding to the
eigenvalue 1. With
ζ := (2ρ2/(1 + ρ2)− 1, 2/(1 + ρ)− 1, 2/(1 + ρ)− 1)T,
we can use (28) to write
µ[r,s](0) =
1
r + s
pis,rR diag
(
s,
1− es1
1− e1 ,
1− es2
1− e2
)
Lζ.
Algebraic computations show that this reduces to
µ[r,s](0) = Er,s/Dr,s, (32)
where
Er,s := 3ar{[2 + (3ar − 1)(es1 + es2 − 2es1es2)− (es1 + es2)](1− ρ)(1 + ρ)S
+ ar(e
s
2 − es1)[5(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2)− 4ρ2]}(1− ρ)2
and
Dr,s := 4(r + s)[1 + (3ar − 1)es1][1 + (3ar − 1)es2](1 + ρ+ ρ2)2S.
This formula will allow us to determine the sign of µ[r,s](0) for all r, s, and ρ.
Theorem 7. Let games A and B be as in Theorem 2 (with the bias parameter
absent). For every pair of positive integers r and s except r = s = 1, µ[r,s](0) > 0
for all ρ ∈ (0, 1), µ[r,s](0) = 0 for ρ = 1, and µ[r,s](0) < 0 for all ρ > 1. In
addition, µ[1,1](0) = 0 for all ρ > 0.
The last assertion of the theorem was known to Pyke (2003). As before,
the Parrondo effect appears (with the bias parameter present) if and only if
µ[r,s](0) > 0. A reverse Parrondo effect, in which two winning games combine to
lose, appears (with a negative bias parameter present) if and only if µ[r,s](0) < 0.
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Corollary 8. Let games A and B be as in Corollary 3 (with the bias parameter
present). For every ρ ∈ (0, 1), and for every pair of positive integers r and
s except r = s = 1, there exists ε0 > 0, depending on ρ, r, and s, such that
Parrondo’s paradox holds for games A and B and pattern [r, s], that is, µA(ε) <
0, µB(ε) < 0, and µ[r,s](ε) > 0, whenever 0 < ε < ε0.
Proof of theorem. Temporarily denote µ[r,s](0) by µ[r,s](ρ, 0) to emphasize its
dependence on ρ. Then, given ρ ∈ (0, 1), the same argument that led to (18)
yields
µ[r,s](1/ρ, 0) = −µ[r,s](ρ, 0), r, s ≥ 1. (33)
(This also follows from (32).) It is therefore enough to treat the case ρ ∈ (0, 1).
Notice that 3ar − 1 = −(− 12 )r for all r ≥ 1 and e1, e2 ∈ (−1, 0), hence Dr,s > 0
for all integers r, s ≥ 1. To show that µ[r,s](0) > 0 it will suffice to show that
Er,s > 0, which is equivalent to showing that
2 + (3ar − 1)(es1 + es2 − 2es1es2)− (es1 + es2)
+ ar(e
s
2 − es1)
5(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2)− 4ρ2
(1− ρ)(1 + ρ)S (34)
is positive. We will show that, except when r = s = 1, (34) is positive for all
integers r, s ≥ 1.
First we consider the case in which r ≥ 2 and s = 1. Noting that e1+e2 = −1,
e2 − e1 = −(1 − ρ)S/[(1 + ρ)(1 + ρ2)], and e1e2 = 2ρ2/[(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2)], (34)
becomes
3 +
(
− 1
2
)r(
1 +
4ρ2
(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2)
)
− 1− (−
1
2 )
r
3
5(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2)− 4ρ2
(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2)
> 3− 1
8
(
1 +
4ρ2
(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2)
)
− 3
8
(
5− 4ρ
2
(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2)
)
= 1 +
ρ2
(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2)
> 0.
On the other hand, if r = s = 1, the left side of the last equation becomes
3− 1
2
(
1 +
4ρ2
(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2)
)
− 1
2
(
5− 4ρ
2
(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2)
)
= 0,
so µ[1,1](0) = 0.
Next we consider the case of r ≥ 2 and s odd, s ≥ 3. Since ρ ∈ (0, 1), we
have e1 = − 12 (1 − x) and e2 = − 12 (1 + x), where 0 < x < 1. Therefore, since s
is odd,
es2 − es1 = −[(1 + x)s − (1− x)s]/2s
= − 1
2s
s∑
k=0
(
s
k
)
[1− (−1)k]xk
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= −x 1
2s−1
∑
1≤k≤s; k odd
(
s
k
)
xk−1
> (e2 − e1) 1
2s−1
∑
1≤k≤s; k odd
(
s
k
)
= e2 − e1, (35)
where the last identity uses the fact that, when s is odd, the odd-numbered
binomial coefficients
(
s
1
)
,
(
s
3
)
, . . . ,
(
s
s
)
are equal to the even-numbered ones
(
s
s−1
)
,(
s
s−3
)
, . . . ,
(
s
0
)
, hence the sum of the odd-numbered ones is 2s−1.
It follows that, since the case r = 1 is excluded,
2 + (3ar − 1)(es1 + es2 − 2es1es2)− (es1 + es2)
+ ar(e
s
2 − es1)
5(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2)− 4ρ2
(1 − ρ)(1 + ρ)S
> 2 +
1
8
(e1 + e2 − 2e1e2) + 3
8
(e2 − e1)5(1 + ρ)
2(1 + ρ2)− 4ρ2
(1− ρ)(1 + ρ)S
= 2− 1
8
(
1 +
4ρ2
(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2)
)
− 3
8
(
5− 4ρ
2
(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2)
)
=
ρ2
(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2)
> 0.
Consider next the case in which r ≥ 1 and s is even. In this case, the
last term in (34) is positive, and the remaining terms are greater than 2 −
(1/4)(5/4)− 5/4 > 0.
Next we treat the case [1, 3] separately. Our formula (32) gives µ[1,3](0) =
3ρ2(1− ρ)3(1 + ρ)(1+ 2ρ+2ρ3+ ρ4)/[4(1+ 6ρ+24ρ2+62ρ3+111ρ4+156ρ5+
180ρ6 + 156ρ7 + 111ρ8 + 62ρ9 + 24ρ10 + 6ρ11 + ρ12)], which is positive since
ρ ∈ (0, 1).
It remains to consider the case of r = 1 and s odd, s ≥ 5. We must show
that
2− 1
2
(es1 + e
s
2 + 2e
s
1e
s
2) +
1
2
(es2 − es1)
5(1 + ρ)2(1 + ρ2)− 4ρ2
(1− ρ)(1 + ρ)S > 0.
Here the inequality of (35) is too crude. Again, we have e1 = − 12 (1 − x) and
e2 = − 12 (1 + x), where x = (1 − ρ)S/[(1 + ρ)(1 + ρ2)] ∈ (0, 1), so we can
replace (1 − ρ)S by x(1 + ρ)(1 + ρ2). We can eliminate the −4ρ2 term in the
fraction, and we can replace the 2es1e
s
2 term by −2es1; in the first case we are
eliminating a positive contribution, and in the second case we are making a
negative contribution more negative. Thus, it will suffice to prove that
2s+2 + [(1 + x)s − (1− x)s]− [(1 + x)s − (1 − x)s](5/x) > 0
for 0 < x < 1, or equivalently that
f(x) :=
2s+2x
(1 + x)s − (1− x)s > 5− x
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for 0 < x < 1. Now [(1 + x)s − (1− x)s]/x is a polynomial of degree s− 1 with
nonnegative coefficients, so f is decreasing on (0, 1) with f(0+) = 2s+1/s and
f(1−) = 4. Further, f(12 ) = 2s+1/[(3/2)s−(1/2)s] > 2s+1/(3/2)s = 2(4/3)s > 5
for s ≥ 5. Thus, our inequality f(x) > 5− x holds for 0 < x ≤ 12 . It remains to
confirm it for 12 < x < 1. On that interval we claim that f(x) + x is decreasing,
and it clearly approaches 5 as x→ 1−. Thus, it remains to show that f ′(x) < −1
for 12 < x < 1. We compute
f ′(x) = 2s+2
[(1 + x)s − (1 − x)s]− sx[(1 + x)s−1 + (1− x)s−1]
[(1 + x)s − (1− x)s]2
< 2s+2
(1 + x)s − sx(1 + x)s−1
[(1 + x)s − (1 − x)s]2
= −2s+2 [(s− 1)x− 1](1 + x)
s−1
[(1 + x)s − (1− x)s]2
< −4 [4(1/2)− 1](1 + x)
s−1
(1 + x)s − (1− x)s
< −2 (1 + x)
s
(1 + x)s − (1 − x)s
< −2,
as required.
Here are four of the simplest cases:
µ[1,1](ε) = −
3(1 + 2ρ+ 18ρ2 + 2ρ3 + ρ4)
4(1 + ρ+ ρ2)2
ε+O(ε2),
µ[1,2](ε) =
(1 − ρ)3(1 + ρ)(1 + 2ρ+ ρ2 + 2ρ3 + ρ4)
3 + 12ρ+ 20ρ2 + 28ρ3 + 36ρ4 + 28ρ5 + 20ρ6 + 12ρ7 + 3ρ8
+O(ε),
µ[2,1](ε) =
(1− ρ)3(1 + ρ)
10 + 20ρ+ 21ρ2 + 20ρ3 + 10ρ4
+O(ε),
µ[2,2](ε) =
3(1− ρ)3(1 + ρ)
8(3 + 6ρ+ 7ρ2 + 6ρ3 + 3ρ4)
+O(ε).
We turn finally to the evaluation of the asymptotic variance per game played
of the player’s cumulative profit. We denote this variance by σ2[r,s](ε), and we
note that it suffices to assume that ε = 0 to obtain the formula up to O(ε).
A formula for σ2[r,s](0) analogous to (32) would be extremely complicated.
We therefore consider the matrix formulas of Section 5 to be in final form.
Temporarily denote σ2[r,s](0) by σ
2
[r,s](ρ, 0) to emphasize its dependence on
ρ. Then, given ρ ∈ (0, 1), the argument that led to (33) yields
σ2[r,s](1/ρ, 0) = σ
2
[r,s](ρ, 0), r, s ≥ 1.
For example, we have
σ2[1,1](ε) =
(
3ρ
1 + ρ+ ρ2
)2
+O(ε),
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σ2[1,2](ε) = 3(8 + 104ρ+ 606ρ
2 + 2220ρ3 + 6189ρ4 + 14524ρ5 + 29390ρ6
+ 51904ρ7 + 81698ρ8 + 115568ρ9 + 147156ρ10 + 169968ρ11
+ 178506ρ12 + 169968ρ13+ 147156ρ14 + 115568ρ15 + 81698ρ16
+ 51904ρ17 + 29390ρ18 + 14524ρ19 + 6189ρ20 + 2220ρ21
+ 606ρ22 + 104ρ23 + 8ρ24)
/(3 + 12ρ+ 20ρ2 + 28ρ3 + 36ρ4 + 28ρ5 + 20ρ6 + 12ρ7 + 3ρ8)3
+O(ε),
σ2[2,1](ε) = 3(414 + 2372ρ+ 6757ρ
2 + 13584ρ3 + 21750ρ4 + 28332ρ5 + 30729ρ6
+ 28332ρ7 + 21750ρ8 + 13584ρ9 + 6757ρ10 + 2372ρ11 + 414ρ12)
/(10 + 20ρ+ 21ρ2 + 20ρ3 + 10ρ4)3 +O(ε),
σ2[2,2](ε) = 9(25 + 288ρ+ 1396ρ
2 + 4400ρ3 + 10385ρ4 + 19452ρ5 + 29860ρ6
+ 38364ρ7 + 41660ρ8 + 38364ρ9 + 29860ρ10 + 19452ρ11
+ 10385ρ12 + 4400ρ13 + 1396ρ14 + 288ρ15 + 25ρ16)
/[16(1 + ρ+ ρ2)2(3 + 6ρ+ 7ρ2 + 6ρ3 + 3ρ4)3] +O(ε).
As functions of ρ ∈ (0, 1), σ2[1,1](0), σ2[1,2](0), and σ2[2,2](0) are increasing, whereas
σ2[2,1](0) is decreasing. All approach 1 as ρ → 1−. Their limits as ρ → 0+ are
respectively 0, 8/9, 25/48, and 621/500.
It should be explicitly noted that
µ[1,1](0) = µB(0) and σ
2
[1,1](0) = σ
2
B(0) (36)
for all ρ > 0. Since these identities may be counterintuitive, let us derive
them in greater detail. We temporarily denote the stationary distributions and
fundamental matrices of PB, PAPB , and PBPA, with subscripts B, AB, and
BA, respectively. Then
piB =
1
2(1 + ρ+ ρ2)
(1 + ρ2, ρ(1 + ρ), 1 + ρ)
and
piBA =
1
2(1 + ρ+ ρ2)
(1 + ρ2, 1 + ρ, ρ(1 + ρ)),
so
µB(0) = piBζ = 0 and µ[1,1](0) =
1
2
piBAζ = 0.
As for the variances, we recall that
σ2B(0) = 1 + 2piBP
′
BZBζ = 1 + piBP
′
B(2ZBζ)
and
σ2[1,1](0) = 1 + piABP
′
A(I + PBZABPA)ζ.
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But piABP
′
A = piBAPBP
′
A and
piBP
′
B =
1− ρ
2(1 + ρ+ ρ2)
(1 + ρ, −ρ, −1),
piBAPBP
′
A =
1− ρ
2(1 + ρ+ ρ2)
(1 + ρ, −1, −ρ),
2ZBζ =
1− ρ
(1 + ρ+ ρ2)2

−(1 + ρ)(1 + 4ρ+ ρ2)3 + ρ+ ρ2 + ρ3
1 + ρ+ ρ2 + 3ρ3

 ,
(I + PBZABPA)ζ =
1− ρ
(1 + ρ+ ρ2)2

−(1 + ρ)(1 + 4ρ+ ρ2)1 + ρ+ ρ2 + 3ρ3
3 + ρ+ ρ2 + ρ3

 ,
so it follows that
σ2B(0) = σ
2
[1,1](0) =
(
3ρ
1 + ρ+ ρ2
)2
.
An interesting special case of (36) is the case ρ = 0. Technically, we have
ruled out this case because we want our underlying Markov chain to be irre-
ducible. Nevertheless, the games are well defined. Assuming X0 = 0, repeated
play of game B leads to the deterministic sequence
(S1, S2, S3, . . .) = (−1, 0,−1, 0,−1, 0, . . .),
hence µB(0) = limn→∞ n
−1E[Sn] = 0 and σ
2
B(0) = limn→∞ n
−1Var(Sn) = 0.
On the other hand, repeated play of pattern AB leads to the random sequence
(S1, S2, S3, . . .) = (−1, 0,−1, 0, . . . ,−1, 0, 1, 2, 2± 1, 2, 2± 1, 2, 2± 1, . . .),
where the number N of initial (−1, 0) pairs is the number of losses at game A
before the first win at game A (in particular, N is nonnegative geometric(12 )),
and the ±1 terms signify independent random variables that are ±1 with prob-
ability 12 each and independent of N . Despite the randomness, the sequence is
bounded, so we still have µ[1,1](0) = 0 and σ
2
[1,1](0) = 0.
When ρ = 1/3, the mean and variance formulas simplify to
µ[1,1](ε) = −
228
169
ε+O(ε2), σ2[1,1](ε) =
81
169
+O(ε),
µ[1,2](ε) =
2416
35601
+O(ε), σ2[1,2](ε) =
14640669052339
15040606062267
+O(ε),
µ[2,1](ε) =
32
1609
+O(ε), σ2[2,1](ε) =
4628172105
4165509529
+O(ε),
µ[2,2](ε) =
4
163
+O(ε), σ2[2,2](ε) =
1923037543
2195688729
+O(ε).
Pyke (2003) obtained µ[2,2](0) ≈ 0.0218363 when ρ = 1/3, but that number is
inconsistent with Ekhad and Zeilberger’s (2000) calculation, confirmed above,
that µ[2,2](0) = 4/163 ≈ 0.0245399.
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7 Patterns of history-dependent games
Let games A and B be as in Section 4; see especially (21). Both games are
losing. In this section we attempt to find conditions on κ and λ such that, for
every pair of positive integers r and s, the pattern [r, s], which stands for r plays
of game A followed by s plays of game B, is winning for sufficiently small ε > 0.
Notice that it will suffice to treat the case ε = 0.
We begin by finding a formula for µ[r,s](0), the asymptotic mean per game
played of the player’s cumulative profit for the pattern [r, s], assuming ε = 0.
Recall that PA is defined by (19) with p0 = p1 = p2 = p3 :=
1
2 , and PB is defined
by (19) with p0 := 1/(1 + κ), p1 = p2 := λ/(1 + λ), and p3 := 1 − λ/(1 + κ),
where κ > 0, λ > 0, and λ < 1 + κ. First, it is clear that P rA = U for all r ≥ 2,
where U is the 4× 4 matrix with all entries equal to 1/4.
As for the spectral representation of PB, its eigenvalues include 1 and the
three roots of the cubic equation x3 + a2x
2 + a1x+ a0 = 0, where
a2 :=
λ− κ
1 + κ
, a1 :=
(λ− κ)λ(2 + κ+ λ)
(1 + κ)2(1 + λ)2
, a0 := − (1− κλ)(1 + κ− λ− λ
2)
(1 + κ)2(1 + λ)2
.
(37)
With the help of Cardano’s formula, we find that the nonunit eigenvalues of PB
are
e1 :=
P +Q
3(1 + κ)(1 + λ)
− λ− κ
3(1 + κ)
,
e2 :=
ωP + ω2Q
3(1 + κ)(1 + λ)
− λ− κ
3(1 + κ)
,
e3 :=
ω2P + ωQ
3(1 + κ)(1 + λ)
− λ− κ
3(1 + κ)
,
where ω := e2pii/3 = − 12 + 12
√
3 i and ω2 = e4pii/3 = ω¯ = − 12 − 12
√
3 i are cube
roots of unity, and
P :=
3
√
β +
√
β2 + 4α3
2
, Q :=
3
√
β −
√
β2 + 4α3
2
,
with
α := (λ − κ)(κ+ 5λ+ 5κλ+ λ2 + κλ2 − λ3),
β := (1 + λ)(27 + 54κ− 27λ+ 27κ2 − 54κλ− 27λ2 + 2κ3 − 42κ2λ
− 30κλ2 + 16λ3 − 14κ3λ+ 6κ2λ2 + 30κλ3 + 5λ4
+ 2κ3λ2 + 21κ2λ3 + 6κλ4 − 2λ5).
Of course, e1, e2, and e3 are each less than 1 in absolute value.
Notice that the definitions of P and Q are slightly ambiguous, owing to the
nonuniqueness of the cube roots. (If (P,Q) is replaced in the definitions of
e1, e2, and e3 by (ωP, ω
2Q) or by (ω2P, ωQ), then e1, e2, and e3 are merely
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permuted.) If β2+4α3 > 0, then P and Q can be taken to be real and distinct,3
in which case e1 is real and e2 and e3 are complex conjugates; in particular, e1,
e2, and e3 are distinct. If β
2 + 4α3 = 0, then P and Q can be taken to be real
and equal, in which case e1, e2, and e3 are real with e2 = e3. If β
2 + 4α3 < 0,
then P and Q can be taken to be complex conjugates, in which case e1, e2, and
e3 are real and distinct; in fact, they can be written
e1 :=
2(
√−α ) cos(θ/3)
3(1 + κ)(1 + λ)
− λ− κ
3(1 + κ)
,
e2 :=
2(
√−α ) cos((θ + 2pi)/3)
3(1 + κ)(1 + λ)
− λ− κ
3(1 + κ)
,
e3 :=
2(
√−α ) cos((θ + 4pi)/3)
3(1 + κ)(1 + λ)
− λ− κ
3(1 + κ)
,
where θ := cos−1(12β/
√−α3 ), which implies that 1 > e1 > e3 > e2 > −1. See
Figure 1.
If we define the vector-valued function r : C 7→ C4 by
r(x)
:=


−λ(1 + κ− λ− λ2)− (1 + λ)(1 + κ− λ− λ2)x+ (1 + κ)(1 + λ)2x2
(1 + κ− λ− λ2)− (1 + κ)(1 + λ)(λ − κ)x− (1 + κ)2(1 + λ)x2
−(1 + κ− λ)(1 − κλ) + (1 + κ)(1− κλ)x
λ(1 − κλ)

 ,
then
r0 := (1, 1, 1, 1)
T, r1 := r(e1), r2 := r(e2), r3 := r(e3),
are corresponding right eigenvectors, and they are linearly independent if and
only if the eigenvalues are distinct. If the eigenvalues are distinct, we define
R := (r0, r1, r2, r3) and L := R
−1.
With
u :=
1
4
(1, 1, 1, 1) and ζ :=


2/(1 + κ)− 1
2λ/(1 + λ)− 1
2λ/(1 + λ)− 1
2[1− λ/(1 + κ)]− 1

 ,
we can use (28) to write
µ[r,s](0) = (r + s)
−1Es, r ≥ 2, s ≥ 1, (38)
where
Es := uRDsLζ
3Caution should be exercised when evaluating Q numerically. Specifically, if x < 0, Math-
ematica returns a complex root for 3
√
x. If the real root is desired, one should enter − 3√−x.
This issue does not arise with P and can be avoided with Q by redefining Q := −α/P .
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Figure 1: The parameter space {(κ, λ) : κ > 0, λ > 0, λ < 1 + κ}, restricted
to κ < 5 and λ < 5. In regions 1, 2, 3, and 6, β2 + 4α3 > 0 (e1 is real, e2 and
e3 are complex conjugates); in regions 4 and 5, β
2 + 4α3 < 0 (e1, e2, and e3
are real). If the conjecture stated below is correct, then, in regions 1, 3, and 4,
µ[r,s](0) > 0 for all r, s ≥ 1; in regions 2, 5, and 6, µ[r,s](0) < 0 for all r, s ≥ 1.
with
Ds := diag
(
s,
1− es1
1− e1 ,
1− es2
1− e2 ,
1− es3
1− e3
)
.
Algebraic simplification leads to
Es = c0 − c1es1 − c2es2 − c3es3, (39)
where
c0 :=
(1 + κ)(λ − κ)(1− λ)
4λ(2 + κ+ λ)
,
and
c1 := f(e1, e2, e3), c2 := f(e2, e3, e1), c3 := f(e3, e1, e2),
with
f(x, y, z) := (λ− κ)[λ(λ − κ)− (1 + κ− λ− λ2)x + (1 + κ)(1 + λ)x2]
· [1 + 3κ− 2λ+ 3κ2 − 4κλ− λ2 + κ3 − 9κλ2 + 6λ3 + 2κ3λ
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− 7κ2λ2 + 6κλ3 + κ3λ2 − 2κ2λ3 + 4κλ4 − 2λ5
− (1 + κ)(1 + λ)(1 + 2κ− 3λ+ κ2 − 2κλ+ κ2λ− 2κλ2
+ 2λ3)(y + z) + (1 + κ)2(1 + λ)2(1 + κ− 2λ)yz]
/[4(1 + κ)3λ(1 + λ)2(1− κλ)(1− x)(x − y)(x− z)].
It remains to consider
µ[1,s](0) = (1 + s)
−1Fs, s ≥ 1, (40)
where
Fs := pis,1RDsLζ.
Here pis,1 is the stationary distribution of P
s
BPA. This is just a left eigenvector
of
R diag(1, es1, e
s
2, e
s
3)LPA
corresponding to eigenvalue 1. Writing pˆi = (pˆi0, pˆi1, pˆi2, pˆi3) := pis,1, we find that
pˆi0 = pˆi1 =
1 + f0(e1, e2, e3)e
s
1 + f0(e2, e3, e1)e
s
2 + f0(e3, e1, e2)e
s
3
4 + f2(e1, e2, e3)es1 + f2(e2, e3, e1)e
s
2 + f2(e3, e1, e2)e
s
3
,
pˆi2 = pˆi3 =
1 + f1(e1, e2, e3)e
s
1 + f1(e2, e3, e1)e
s
2 + f1(e3, e1, e2)e
s
3
4 + f2(e1, e2, e3)es1 + f2(e2, e3, e1)e
s
2 + f2(e3, e1, e2)e
s
3
,
where
f0(x, y, z) := [1 + κ− 2λ− (1 + κ)x]g(y, z)/[2(1 + κ)2λ(1 + λ)(x − y)(x− z)],
f1(x, y, z) := [(1− λ)(1 + κ− λ− λ2)− (1 + λ)(1 − κ2 + κλ− λ2)x
+ (1 + κ)(1 + λ)(λ − κ)x2]g(y, z)
/[2(1 + κ)2λ(1 + λ)(1 − κλ)(x − y)(x− z)],
f2(x, y, z) := [2 + 2κ− 4λ− 2κλ− κ2λ+ 2κλ2 + λ3 − (2 + κ− κ2 + λ
− 2κ2λ− λ2 + κλ2 − λ3)x+ (1 + κ)(1 + λ)(λ− κ)x2]g(y, z)
/[(1 + κ)2λ(1 + λ)(1 − κλ)(x − y)(x− z)],
with
g(y, z) := 1 + 2κ− 3λ+ κ2 − 2κλ+ κ2λ− 2κλ2 + 2λ3
− (1 + κ)(1 + λ)(1 + κ− 2λ)(y + z) + (1 + κ)2(1 + λ)yz.
Letting v := (1/4)(1, 1, −1, −1), we can write
pˆi = u+ (pˆi − u) = u+ (4pˆi0 − 1)v,
so Fs = Es +GsHs, where
Gs := 4pˆi0 − 1 = 2(pˆi0 − pˆi2)
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= 2
(f0 − f1)(e1, e2, e3)es1 + (f0 − f1)(e2, e3, e1)es2 + (f0 − f1)(e3, e1, e2)es3
4 + f2(e1, e2, e3)es1 + f2(e2, e3, e1)e
s
2 + f2(e3, e1, e2)e
s
3
and
Hs := vRDsLζ.
The argument that gave us (39) yields
Hs = b0 − b1es1 − b2es2 − b3es3,
where
b0 := −1 + κ− 2λ− λ
2 + κλ2
4λ(1 + λ)
,
and
b1 := h(e1, e2, e3), b2 := h(e2, e3, e1), b3 := h(e3, e1, e2),
with
h(x, y, z) := [2 + 2κ− 4λ− 2κλ− κ2λ+ 2κλ2 + λ3 − (2 + κ+ λ− κ2 − λ2
− 2κ2λ+ κλ2 − λ3)x+ (1 + κ)(1 + λ)(λ − κ)x2][1 + 3κ− 2λ
+ 3κ2 − 4κλ− λ2 + κ3 − 9κλ2 + 6λ3 + 2κ3λ− 7κ2λ2 + 6κλ3
+ κ3λ2 − 2κ2λ3 + 4κλ4 − 2λ5 − (1 + κ)(1 + λ)(1 + 2κ− 3λ
+ κ2 − 2κλ+ κ2λ− 2κλ2 + 2λ3)(y + z)
+ (1 + κ)2(1 + λ)2(1 + κ− 2λ)yz]
/[4(1 + κ)3λ(1 + λ)2(1− κλ)(1 − x)(x − y)(x− z)].
Thus, (38) and (40) provide explicit, albeit complicated, formulas for µ[r,s](0)
for all r, s ≥ 1. They are valid provided only that β2 + 4α3 6= 0 (ensuring that
PB has distinct eigenvalues) and κλ 6= 1 (ensuring that the denominators of the
formulas are nonzero).
We can extend the formulas to κλ = 1 by noting that, in this case, 0 is
an eigenvalue of PB and the two remaining nonunit eigenvalues, which can be
obtained from the quadratic formula, are distinct from 0 and 1 unless κ = λ = 1.
Here we are using the assumption that λ < 1+κ, hence κ > (−1+√5)/2. This
allows a spectral representation in such cases and again leads to formulas for
µ[r,s](0) for all r, s ≥ 1, which we do not include here. Writing the numerator of
f(x, y, z) temporarily as (λ−κ)p(x)q(y, z), notice that the two nonunit, nonzero
eigenvalues coincide, when κλ = 1, with the roots of p(x), and this ordered pair
of eigenvalues is also a zero of q. This explains why the singularity on the curve
κλ = 1 is removable.
We cannot prove the analogue of Theorem 7 in this setting, so we state it as
a conjecture.
Conjecture. Let games A and B be as in Theorem 4 (with the bias parameter
absent). For every pair of positive integers r and s, µ[r,s](0) > 0 if κ < λ < 1
or κ > λ > 1, µ[r,s](0) = 0 if κ = λ or λ = 1, and µ[r,s](0) < 0 if λ < min(κ, 1)
or λ > max(κ, 1).
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Corollary 9. Assume that the conjecture is true for some pair (κ, λ) satisfying
0 < κ < λ < 1 or κ > λ > 1. Let games A and B be as in Corollary 5 (with the
bias parameter present). For every pair of positive integers r and s, there exists
ε0 > 0, depending on κ, λ, r, and s, such that Parrondo’s paradox holds for
games A, B, and pattern [r, s], that is, µA(ε) < 0, µB(ε) < 0, and µ[r,s](ε) > 0,
whenever 0 < ε < ε0.
We can prove a very small part of the conjecture. Let K be the set of
positive fractions with one-digit numerators and denominators, that is, K :=
{k/l : k, l = 1, 2, . . . , 9}, and note that K has 55 distinct elements.
Theorem 10. The conjecture is true if (a) κ = λ > 0, (b) κ > 0 and λ = 1,
or (c) κ, λ ∈ K, λ < 1 + κ, κ 6= λ, λ 6= 1, β2 + 4α3 6= 0, and κλ 6= 1.
Remark. Parts (a) and (b) are the fair cases. Part (c) treats 2123 unfair cases
(702 winning, 1421 losing), including the case κ = 1/9 and λ = 1/3 studied by
Parrondo, Harmer, and Abbott (2000). (The assumption that β2 + 4α3 6= 0 is
redundant.) The proof of part (c) is computer assisted.
Proof. We begin with case (a), κ = λ > 0. In this case c0 = c1 = c2 = c3 = 0,
hence Es = 0, while
(f0 − f1)(x, y, z)
= − (λ− κ)[λ(λ − κ)− (1 + κ− λ− λ
2)x + (1 + κ)(1 + λ)x2]g(y, z)
2(1 + κ)2λ(1 + λ)(1 − κλ)(x − y)(x− z) ,
hence Gs = 0. We conclude that µ[r,s](0) = 0 for all r, s ≥ 1 in this case. The
argument fails only when κ = λ = 1 because, assuming that κ = λ, only then is
β2 + 4α3 = 0 or is κλ = 1. But in that case game B is indistinguishable from
game A, so again µ[r,s](0) = µA(0) = 0 for all r, s ≥ 1.
Next we consider case (b), λ = 1 and either 0 < κ < 1 or κ > 1. We write
the numerator of f(x, y, z) temporarily as (1 − κ)p(x)q(y, z). Each nonunit
eigenvalue of PB is a root of the cubic equation x
3 + a2x
2 + a1x+ a0 = 0 with
coefficients (37). With λ = 1, this equation, multiplied by 4(1 + κ)2, becomes
0 = 4(1 + κ)2x3 + 4(1 + κ)(1− κ)x2 + (3 + κ)(1− κ)x+ (1 − κ)2
= [2(1 + κ)x2 + (1− κ)x+ 1− κ][2(1 + κ)x+ 1− κ]
= p(x)[2(1 + κ)x+ 1− κ].
Moreover, we have β2 + 4α3 = 108(1 + κ)2(1 − κ)3(7 + 9κ). If κ < 1, then
β2+4α3 > 0 (the eigenvalues are distinct with e2 and e3 complex conjugates). In
this case, p has complex roots, so p(e2) = p(e3) = 0 and e1 = −(1−κ)/[2(1+κ)];
in addition, e2 and e3, being roots of p, have sum −(1−κ)/[2(1+κ)] and product
(1 − κ)/[2(1 + κ)], hence q(e2, e3) = 0. Therefore, c0 = c1 = c2 = c3 = 0 and
Es = 0. Finally, (f0 − f1)(x, y, z) has p(x) as a factor and g(e2, e3) = 0, hence
Gs = 0. On the other hand, if κ > 1, then β
2 + 4α3 < 0 (the eigenvalues are
real and distinct). In this case, two of the three eigenvalues e1, e2, and e3 are
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roots of p, so the argument just given in the case κ < 1 applies in this case as
well with the two mentioned eigenvalues replacing e2 and e3.
We turn to case (c), but let us begin by treating the general case. Given
κ > 0 and λ > 0 with λ < 1+ κ, κ 6= λ, and λ 6= 1, we clearly have c0 6= 0. The
conjecture says that Es and Fs := Es + GsHs have the same sign as c0 for all
s ≥ 1.
We assume in addition that β2+4α3 6= 0 and κλ 6= 1. If β2+4α3 > 0, then
we can take e1 real and e2 and e3 complex conjugates. It follows that c1 is real
and c2 and c3 are complex conjugates. Similarly, b1 is real and b2 and b3 are
complex conjugates. Therefore,
Es = c0 − c1es1 − c2es2 − c3es3 = c0 − c1es1 − 2Re(c2es2),
Hs = b0 − b1es1 − b2es2 − b3es3 = b0 − b1es1 − 2Re(b2es2).
If β2 + 4α3 < 0, then e1, e2, and e3 are real and distinct, as we have seen, and
therefore c1, c2, c3, b1, b2, b3 are real. In either case, Es has the same sign as c0
if
|c0| − {|c1| |e1|s + |c2| |e2|s + |c3| |e3|s} (41)
is positive. Notice that (41) increases in s and is positive for s large enough.
Given (κ, λ) with c0 6= 0, β2 + 4α3 6= 0, and κλ 6= 1, there exists s0 ≥ 1,
depending on (κ, λ), such that (41) is positive for all s ≥ s0. It is then enough to
verify by direct computation that Es has the same sign as c0 for s = 1, 2, . . . , s0−
1. In fact, we believe, but cannot prove, that s0 is never larger than 3. If true,
this would imply that the conjecture holds for r ≥ 2 and s ≥ 1. (We are using
the observations that µ[r,s](0) is continuous in (κ, λ) and that the set of (κ, λ)
such that β2 + 4α3 6= 0 and κλ 6= 1 is dense. We are also implicitly using the
fact, not yet proved, that µ[r,s](0) 6= 0 on the curves β2 + 4α3 = 0 and κλ = 1,
except at κ = λ = 1.)
The case r = 1 is more complicated. Observe that Fs has the same sign as
c0 if
|c0| −
{
|c1| |e1|s + |c2| |e2|s + |c3| |e3|s
+ 2
|f0 − f1|(e1, e2, e3)|e1|s + |f0 − f1|(e2, e3, e1)|e2|s + |f0 − f1|(e3, e1, e2)|e3|s
4− |f2|(e1, e2, e3)|e1|s − |f2|(e2, e3, e1)|e2|s − |f2|(e3, e1, e2)|e3|s
· (|b0|+ |b1| |e1|s + |b2| |e2|s + |b3| |e3|s)
}
(42)
is positive, a stronger condition than requiring that (41) be positive. Notice
that (42) increases in s and is positive for s large enough. Given (κ, λ), again
with c0 6= 0, β2 + 4α3 6= 0, and κλ 6= 1, there exists s1 ≥ 1, depending on
(κ, λ), such that (42) holds for all s ≥ s1. It is then enough to verify by direct
computation that Fs has the same sign as c0 for s = 1, 2, . . . , s1 − 1. It appears
that s1 can be quite large.
We have carried out the required estimates in Mathematica for the 2123
cases of part (c). There were no exceptions to the conjecture. Table 1 lists a
few of these cases.
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Table 1: A few of the 2123 cases treated by Theorem 10(c). s0 is the smallest
positive integer s that makes (41) positive. s1 is the smallest positive integer s
that makes (42) positive.
(κ, λ) region (p0, p1, p3) s0 s1
of Fig. 1
(1/9, 1/3) 1 (9/10, 1/4, 7/10) 1 2
(1/3, 1/9) 6 (3/4, 1/10, 11/12) 1 6
(9, 3) 3 (1/10, 3/4, 7/10) 1 3
(1/9, 1/8) 1 (9/10, 1/9, 71/80) 1 6
(1/9, 8/9) 1 (9/10, 8/17, 1/5) 2 3
(8, 1/9) 6 (1/9, 1/10, 80/81) 1 27
(4, 9/2) 2 (1/5, 9/11, 1/10) 1 3
(3, 3/2) 4 (1/4, 3/5, 5/8) 1 1
(3, 2/3) 5 (1/4, 2/5, 5/6) 1 2
Here are four of the simplest cases:
µ[1,1](ε) =
(λ− κ)(1 − λ)
2(2 + κ+ λ)(1 + λ)
+O(ε),
µ[1,2](ε) =
(λ− κ)(1− λ)(κ + λ+ 2κλ)(2 + 2κ+ κλ− λ2)
3(1 + κ)(1 + λ)(2 + κ+ λ)(κ + 3λ+ 4κλ+ κλ2 − λ3) +O(ε),
µ[r,1](ε) =
(λ− κ)(1− λ)
2(r + 1)(1 + κ)(1 + λ)
+O(ε), r ≥ 2,
µ[r,2](ε) =
(λ− κ)(1− λ)(1 + 2κ− λ)
2(r + 2)(1 + κ)2(1 + λ)
+O(ε), r ≥ 2.
Notice that the final factor in the numerator and the final factor in the de-
nominator of µ[1,2](0) are both positive. (Consider two cases, λ ≤ κ and
κ < λ < 1 + κ.) The same is true of µ[r,2](0), r ≥ 2.
We turn finally to the evaluation of the asymptotic variance per game played
of the player’s cumulative profit. We denote this variance by σ2[r,s](ε), and we
note that it suffices to assume that ε = 0 in the calculation to obtain the formula
up to O(ε).
A formula for σ2[r,s](0) analogous to (38) and (40) would be extremely com-
plicated. We therefore consider the matrix formulas of Section 5 to be in final
form.
For example, we have
σ2[1,1](ε) = (16 + 32κ+ 48λ+ 18κ
2 + 124κλ+ 18λ2 + κ3 + 91κ2λ+ 71κλ2
− 3λ3 + 22κ3λ+ 28κ2λ2 + 38κλ3 − 8λ4 + κ3λ2 + 15κ2λ3
− κλ4 + λ5)/[2(1 + λ)2(2 + κ+ λ)3] +O(ε),
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σ2[r,1](ε) = 1−
(λ − κ)(8 + 7κ+ 17λ+ 18κλ+ 6λ2 + 7κλ2 + λ3)
4(r + 1)(1 + κ)2(1 + λ)2
+O(ε),
σ2[r,2](ε) = 1 + (8 + 36κ− 20λ+ 71κ2 − 42κλ− 37λ2 + 64κ3 + 24κ2λ
− 120κλ2 + 20κ4 + 96κ3λ− 118κ2λ2 − 12κλ3 + 6λ4
+ 48κ4λ− 16κ3λ2 − 24κ2λ3 + 4κλ4 + 4λ5 + 20κ4λ2
− 16κ3λ3 − k2λ4 + 6κλ5 − λ6)/[4(r + 2)(1 + κ)4(1 + λ)2]
+O(ε),
for r ≥ 2. The formula for σ2[1,2](ε) is omitted above; σ2[1,2](0) is the ratio of two
polynomials in κ and λ of degree 16, the numerator having 110 terms.
When κ = 1/9 and λ = 1/3, the mean and variance formulas simplify to
µ[1,1](ε) =
1
44
+O(ε), σ2[1,1](ε) =
8945
10648
+O(ε),
µ[1,2](ε) =
203
16500
+O(ε), σ2[1,2](ε) =
1003207373
998250000
+O(ε),
µ[2,1](ε) =
1
60
+O(ε), σ2[2,1](ε) =
1039
1200
+O(ε),
µ[2,2](ε) =
1
100
+O(ε), σ2[2,2](ε) =
19617
20000
+O(ε).
8 Why does Parrondo’s paradox hold?
Several authors (e.g., Ekhad and Zeilberger 2000, Rahmann 2002, Philips and
Feldman 2004) have questioned whether Parrondo’s paradox should be called a
paradox. Ultimately, this depends on one’s definition of the word “paradox,”
but conventional usage (e.g., the St. Petersburg paradox, Bertrand’s paradox,
Simpson’s paradox, and the waiting-time paradox) requires not that it be un-
explainable, only that it be surprising or counterintuitive. Parrondo’s paradox
would seem to meet this criterion.
A more important issue, addressed by various authors, is, Why does Par-
rondo’s paradox hold? Here we should distinguish between the random mixture
version and the nonrandom pattern version of the paradox. The former is easy to
understand, based on an observation of Moraal (2000), subsequently elaborated
by Costa, Fackrell, and Taylor (2005). See also Behrends (2002). Consider the
capital-dependent games first. The mapping f(ρ) := (ρ2/(1 + ρ2), 1/(1 + ρ)) =
(p0, p1) from (0,∞) into the unit square (0, 1)× (0, 1) defines a curve represent-
ing the fair games, with the losing games below and the winning games above.
The interior of the line segment from f(1) = (12 ,
1
2 ) to f(ρ) lies in the winning
region if ρ < 1 (i.e., p0 <
1
2 ) and in the losing region if ρ > 1 (i.e., p0 >
1
2 ),
as can be seen by plotting the curve (as in, e.g., Harmer and Abbott 2002).
These line segments correspond to the random mixtures of game A and game
B. Actually, it is not necessary to plot the curve. Using (16), we note that
the curve defined by f is simply the graph of g(p0) := 1/(1 +
√
p0/(1− p0) )
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(0 < p0 < 1), and by calculating g
′′ we can check that g is strictly convex on
(0, 12 ] and strictly concave on [
1
2 , 1).
The same kind of reasoning applies to the history-dependent games, except
that now the mapping f(κ, λ) := (1/(1+κ), λ/(1+λ), 1−λ/(1+κ)) = (p0, p1, p3)
from {(κ, λ) : κ > 0, λ > 0, λ < 1 + κ} into the unit cube (0, 1)× (0, 1)× (0, 1)
defines a surface representing the fair games, with the losing games below and
the winning games above. The interior of the line segment from f(1, 1) =
(12 ,
1
2 ,
1
2 ) to f(κ, λ) lies in the winning region if κ < λ < 1 (i.e., p0 + p1 > 1 and
p1 <
1
2 ) or κ > λ > 1 (i.e., p0 + p1 < 1 and p1 >
1
2 ). It is possible but difficult
to see this by plotting the surface on a computer screen using 3D graphics.
Instead, we note using (20) that the surface defined by f is simply the graph of
g(p0, p1) := 1− p0p1/(1− p1) (0 < p0 < 1, 0 < p1 < 1, p0p1 < 1− p1). So with
h(t) := g((1− t)/2 + tp0, (1− t)/2 + tp1) for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, we compute
h′′(t) = −4(p0 + p1 − 1)(2p1 − 1)
[1− (2p1 − 1)t]3
and observe that h′′(t) > 0 for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 if and only if both p0 + p1 > 1 and
p1 <
1
2 , or both p0+ p1 < 1 and p1 >
1
2 . In other words, g restricted to the line
segment from (12 ,
1
2 ) to (p0, p1) is strictly convex under these conditions. This
confirms the stated assertion.
The explanations for the nonrandom pattern version of the paradox are less
satisfactory. Ekhad and Zeilberger (2000) argued that it is because “matrices
(usually) do not commute.” The “Boston interpretation” of H. Eugene Stan-
ley’s group at Boston University claims that it is due to noise. As Kay and
Johnson (2003) put it, “losing cycles in game B are effectively broken up by the
memoryless behavior, or ‘noise’, of game A.” Let us look at this in more detail.
We borrow some assumptions and notation from the end of Section 5. As-
sume that ε = 0. Denote by P ′A the matrix with (i, j)th entry (PA)ijw(i, j),
and assume that P ′A has row sums equal to 0. Denote by P
′
B the matrix with
(i, j)th entry (PB)ijw(i, j), and define ζ := P
′
B(1, 1, . . . , 1)
T to be the vector
of row sums of P ′B. Let piB be the unique stationary distribution of PB, and
let pis,r be the unique stationary distribution of P
s
BP
r
A. Then the asymptotic
mean per game played of the player’s cumulative profit for the pattern [r, s]
when ε = 0 is
µ[r,s](0) = (r + s)
−1pis,r(I + PB + · · ·+ P s−1B )ζ.
If it were the case that pis,r = piB, then we would have
µ[r,s](0) = (r + s)
−1spiBζ = 0,
and the Parrondo effect would not appear. If we attribute the fact that pis,r
is not equal to piB to the “noise” caused by game A, then we can justify the
Boston interpretation.
The reason this explanation is less satisfactory is that it gives no clue as
to the sign of µ[r,s](0), which indicates whether the pattern [r, s] is winning or
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losing. We propose an alternative explanation (the Utah interpretation?) that
tends to support the Boston interpretation. To motivate it, we observe that
(r+s)µ[r,s](0) can be interpreted as the asymptotic mean per cycle of r plays of
game A and s plays of game B of the player’s cumulative profit when ε = 0. If s
is large relative to r, then the r plays of game A might reasonably be interpreted
as periodic noise in an otherwise uninterrupted sequence of plays of game B.
We will show that
lim
s→∞
(r + s)µ[r,s](0)
exists and is finite for every r ≥ 1. If the limit is positive for some r ≥ 1, then
µ[r,s](0) > 0 for that r and all s sufficiently large. If the limit is negative for
some r ≥ 1, then µ[r,s](0) < 0 for that r and all s sufficiently large. These
conclusions are weaker than those of Theorem 7 and the conjecture but the
derivation is much simpler, depending only on the fundamental matrix of PB,
not on its spectral representation.
Here is the derivation. First, pis,r = piP
r
A, where pi is the unique stationary
distribution of P rAP
s
B. Now
lim
s→∞
P rAP
s
B = P
r
AΠB = ΠB,
where ΠB is the square matrix each of whose rows is piB. We conclude that
pis,r → piBP rA as s→∞ and therefore that
lim
s→∞
(r + s)µ[r,s](0) = lim
s→∞
pis,r(I + PB + · · ·+ P s−1B )ζ
= piBP
r
A lim
s→∞
[ s−1∑
n=0
(P nB −ΠB) + sΠB
]
ζ
= piBP
r
A
[ ∞∑
n=0
(P nB −ΠB)
]
ζ
= piBP
r
A(ZB −ΠB)ζ
= piBP
r
AZBζ, r ≥ 1,
where ZB denotes the fundamental matrix of PB (see (7)). Since piBZB = piB
and piBζ = 0, it is the P
r
A factor, or the “noise” caused by game A, that leads
to a (typically) nonzero limit.
In the capital-dependent setting we can evaluate this limit as
lim
s→∞
(r + s)µ[r,s](0) =
3ar(1 − ρ)3(1 + ρ)
2(1 + ρ+ ρ2)2
, r ≥ 1,
where ar is as in (31), while in the history-dependent setting it becomes
lim
s→∞
(r + s)µ[r,s](0) =
(1 + κ)(λ− κ)(1 − λ)
4λ(2 + κ+ λ)
, r ≥ 1.
Of course we could derive these limits from the formulas in Sections 6 and 7, but
the point is that they do not require the spectral representation of PB—they
36
are simpler than that. They also explain why the conditions on ρ are the same
in Theorems 2 and 7, and the conditions on κ and λ are the same in Theorem
4 and the conjecture.
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